Reasonably good corporate governance by Nordberg, Donald
  
Reasonably good corporate governance 
Donald Nordberg 
 
 
 
Developmental paper for BAM track on Corporate Governance, 2014 
Abstract: Attempts to determine what constitutes “good” corporate governance have become 
mired in the quicksand of the ethical conflict between duty and utility, virtue and rights, as 
well as the fight over for whose good the organization exists. This paper takes a different 
tack. Drawing upon evidence from the efforts to build and develop the UK code of corporate 
governance, it argues that the nature of “good” is intractable, but that in the practical world a 
philosophically pragmatic approach applies, exemplified in the preference for a comply-or-
explain approach rather than more formal modes of regulation. Using Toulmin’s (2001) of 
advocacy the reasonable, in opposition to the rational, it argues that “reasonably good” 
governance is the best that can be expected, given the contingent nature of organizational life 
and strategies and the uncertain and potentially fungible benefits of various mechanisms of 
corporate governance.  
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Once upon a time … 
The story of corporate governance is often told as a fable of good and evil: the good 
journalists at Mirror Group Newspapers and the evil Robert Maxwell who stole their 
pensions to prop up his failing business empire, the good shareholders of Enron defrauded 
by the omnipotent and “unfettered” CEO, or the poor fisherman in the Gulf of Mexico 
deprived of their livelihoods by the greedy oilmen (and a few oil women) at BP, Halliburton 
and the rest. For most boards of directors, most of the time, the story is a more mundane one: 
forms to fill in, boxes to tick, time to be wasted in compliance that might be better spent 
strategizing or negotiating access to value and scarce resources. No wonder corporate 
governance has given itself a bad name.  
Evidence of the bad name is often more anecdotal than empirically verifiable: That 
corporate governance is a good is politically incorrect to deny. But in private conversations, 
corporate directors complain:  
 
A non-executive director of one of the world’s largest corporations, who 
chairs its remuneration committee, meets an old acquaintance from earlier 
in their business careers. “What are you doing now?” the non-exec asks. 
“I’m working in corporate governance,” his former colleague replies. “If I 
had my gun now I would shoot,” the non-exec says and walks away.  
Or of the chairman of a major financial services firm who meets a 
complete stranger at a social event, someone who also expresses an interest 
in corporate governance. The next sentence could not be printed in a 
family academic journal, both for its diction and lest the slander it voiced 
became libel.  
These tales suggest that corporate governance is something these directors take very 
seriously. They care about their companies and resent the intrusions by what they see as do-
gooding outsiders trying to impose ways of thinking and standards of action on others, when 
those others are responsible, in a legal sense, for the decisions to be made. Yet directors like 
these are also responsible, in a moral sense, for cases of malfeasance we have seen at all too 
many corporations. Those excesses have led, over several decades, to a movement to identify 
good or even best practice in corporate governance, reinforced by mechanisms, structures 
and procedures. Scholars have then attempted to discover a formula for good board 
performance by assessing the correlation of one or several mechanisms of governance, with 
one or another measure of performance. Such efforts seem to yield ambiguous results, even 
if we could agree that the selected measures were the ones that somehow mattered.  
This paper takes a different approach. It argues that good governance is elusive, 
contingent upon too many factors that cannot be controlled, that is, factors the directors 
could not reasonably control, however rational their thought processes were. This argument 
recalls – and in its detail is based upon – the distinction in Toulmin (2001) between what’s 
reasonable and what’s rational. It is analogous to but not the same as the bounded rationality 
in the work of Simon (1955, 1959, 1978). Toulmin argues that epistemological and 
ontological limits to certainty make the rational, as we have come to understand it in modern 
thought, impossible. The limits of human intelligence alone do not create the problem, but 
rather the complexity of the problem itself.  
If the problems of governing a corporation or another type of organization are inherently 
complex and intractable, then efforts to control them – to construct mechanism of 
governance – must falter when they encounter the law of requisite variety (Ashby, 1958, 
    
1968/2011). The best we can reasonably expect of a director and board is that they are 
reasonable, recognize the contingency of their situation, and be – in the philosophic sense – 
pragmatic in their decisions (Rorty, 1989). That involves trading off one set of norms for 
another, when the one no longer seems to suit the circumstances and the other holds out hope 
of something better.  
Let us first consider the thinking of Toulmin (1992, 2001, 2003) on rationality and 
reasonableness, as well as the notion of contingency in Rorty (1989). We will then explore 
the landscape of corporate governance, paying particular attention to the UK, where the code 
of conduct promulgated in 1992 became a model for much of the world (Aguilera & Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2009). We will look at the conflicting aims and logics that actors bring to the field 
and that contest for the attention that will shape future social practice (Ocasio, 2011).  
Next we rummage through the garbage can of prescriptions, whose apparent 
ineffectiveness have made the crisis in corporate governance a recurrent one (MacAvoy & 
Millstein, 2003) looking for contingencies where some methods might work some of the 
time. To give an empirical turn to the analysis, let us then consider that principle of corporate 
governance called “comply or explain”, a principle much admired and reviled as it 
developed in UK corporate governance. Through doing so, the paper will demonstrate how 
corporate governance came to embody the contingency, irony and solidarity of Rorty and 
institutionalize a logic grounded in Toulmin’s type of reason.  
Reason, rationality and contingency 
Particularly in the wake of near-meltdown of the financial system in 2008, various 
commentators have blamed the crisis in corporate governance on excessive faith in the 
rationality of efficient markets (Fama, 1970) and of managers to account for risk. Evidence 
of this is in the popularity of the Black Swan conception of Nassim Nicholas Taleb (2007), 
which seemed in hindsight to have predicted the turmoil. Fama’s original thinking of market 
efficiency in the late 1950s assumed that rational investors would, through the wisdom of 
markets, collectively find the right price for assets, provided all relevant information was 
freely and uniformly available.  
At the same time, however, doubts about rationality were emerging elsewhere in the 
literatures of economics and epistemology. Herbert Simon wrote of rationality as being 
bounded by our ability to compute the values at stake (Simon, 1955, 1959), creating a new 
field of behavioural economics. This period, too, saw doubts about rationality emerge in a 
rather different setting. The philosopher Stephen Toulmin published the book The Uses of 
Argument in 1958 (republished 2003), which discussed the importance of field-dependent 
variables in logic, suggesting a limit not just to the ability of people to determine what’s 
rational, but also to find a single rationality at all. This thinking contributed to the sense of 
an inherent non-rationality arising in physics since Einstein and Heisenberg, and evident in 
the sociology that came to be called post-modernism.  
In his book Cosmopolis, Toulmin (1992) traced excessive faith in rationality to 
Descartes and the resulting narrow conception of scientific inquiry that followed in the 
tradition he helped to establish. Returning to these themes in Return to Reason (Toulmin, 
2001), he argued that the best we could expect in an uncertain and contingent world was that 
people acted reasonably. It resonated with the contingency associated with the pragmatists 
Thomas Dewey and William James and central to the work of Richard Rorty (1989). 
Reasonableness, in Toulmin’s terms, is “the possibility of living, as in pre-modern times, 
without any absolute necessities or certainties” (2001, p. 1). Rationality, linked 
philosophically to positivism and certainty, falters at the hurdle of describing what happens 
    
in practice. Under reasonableness, analytic philosophy of the 1930 to 1950s has retreated, 
and moral problems (he uses the example of medical practice) “are being handled less by 
strictly theoretical analysis than on a ‘case-by-case’ basis” (Toulmin, 2001, p. 167). In the 
face of complexity, of the sort of complexity that defies calculation, multiple answers may 
apply to the same situation, and what’s best is impossible to determine.  
These ideas resonate with the themes of corporate governance, as we shall see. For 
corporate governance itself lacks clear definition, and actors from various disciplines take 
very different stances not only as to what is the right answer but even as to what is the right 
question. 
Corporate governance as a landscape 
Corporate governance scholars sometimes describe their subject as a field, but it isn’t, 
not in a conventional way. Metaphorically, fields have boundaries – limits where they abut 
other fields or paths – with dividing lines that define their shape and delineate ownership. In 
sociology, fields have members who share a common language, making communication 
possible, and common understanding, making communication sometimes unnecessary. That 
is, they have norms, rules of the game, creating institutional arrangements with their own 
logics that members understand even when they might not articulate them (Fligstein & 
McAdam, 2012).  
A field that isn’t 
Corporate governance isn’t like that. The organizational field of corporations overlaps 
the field of institutional investors (some of which are themselves corporations). Their 
advisers inhabit other fields, the professions of law and accountancy prominent among them. 
These fields arise in different broad social domains, what Puxty and colleagues (1987) call 
organizing principles, or what Friedland and Alford (1991) and Thornton (2004) call 
institutional orders, where deeply held beliefs are rooted: principal among are the belief in 
efficiency of markets, or the natural justice of families; the immanent power of religion, the 
hierarchy of the corporation, or the bureaucracy of the state.  
In corporate governance the state is an important actor, setting out the legal basis for 
corporations and the regulatory regimes they follow. But as we will see, there are reasons to 
believe it is a weakened actor, and was a particularly weak one as UK corporate governance 
became codified. Actors from other fields, arising in other orders, play a prominent role, too. 
Corporations in Thornton’s view warrant an order of their own. Institutional investors 
populate the field of capital markets with a power than overwhelm the mere “savers” who 
co-habit it. Advisers, whether in law, accountancy or management consulting, sit in fields 
governed by professional logics, with their adherence to a body of knowledge that nominally 
takes precedence over the merely commercial. There are many other actors, less powerful, in 
other fields, too. Corporate governance looks different to different actors, depending on 
where they stand.  
In increasingly global investment markets, even the geographic boundaries of fields have 
become blurred, and as that happens questions arise about who rules apply, which can throw 
the legitimacy of the rules themselves into doubt. Indeed, that globalization of markets 
diminished the power of the state, reducing the constraints on corporations as well as 
markets.  
Let’s call corporate governance something else, then, a landscape. A picture of it 
includes a number of fields. Their definition can be pretty difficult to distinguish unless to 
    
move to a different vantage point, but doing so presents a different picture, a different 
landscape, similar and recognizable but not the same. Some of the common understandings 
may prove, therefore, to be common misunderstandings, where actors use the same words to 
mean something different, and where meanings may be translated to fit with the actors’ 
individual meaning systems (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996), leading to differing 
interpretations that may remain without articulation, because in this non-field we still, 
almost, understand.  
In an oft-cited paragraph, the Cadbury Commission called corporate governance “the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled”. The next sentence added: “Boards 
of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies” (Cadbury, 1992, Section 
2.5). This seemingly uncontroversial statement was the subject of controversy during the 
drafting. This passage was rendered rather differently in the draft text published in May 
1992. It described corporate governance as “the system by which companies are run” adding: 
“At the centre of the system is the board of directors whose actions are subject to laws, 
regulations and the shareholder in the general meeting” (CAD-022291). In the draft, the 
board was not in charge, merely at the centre of a complete web of governance 
arrangements.  
Under pressure from the many, often hostile voices from corporations responding to the 
draft (Nordberg, 2012; Spira & Slinn, 2013), the text was changed and the board became 
preeminent. But the language remained that of a “system”, with interacting components. In 
the view of the landscape framed by the Cadbury Code, the institutional orders of the state 
and the market were present, but as the code became institutionalized the order of the 
corporation was the dominant object in view.  
Logics in the landscape 
 The various fields in the landscape of corporate governance each come with their own 
sets of rituals and routines, and the institutions they constitute have their own logics. In the 
institutional logics perspective (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012), social action is 
governed through the interplay of logics in an inter-institutional system, as institutions from 
different orders contest for attention. While there are several logics at work in this landscape, 
three are particularly important and feature prominently in the debate over the code: 
corporations, investors and professional advisers. 
Corporations and their boards might be expected to be guided by logics that give 
primacy to the manager at the top of the internal hierarchy. This is a logic of managerialism 
in Lok (2010), which in its beneficial manifestation has links to stewardship theory (Davis, 
Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). But managerialism is also associated self-serving 
managers, whose neglect of shareholder interests provided the springboard for corporate 
governance reform in the US and the rise of shareholder activism in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Pearlstein, 2014). 
Those changes in thinking involved an assumption of shareholder primacy, in evidence 
in the recipes of agency theory to align managerial pay with shareholder returns (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The assumption here is that shareholders operate on a different logic, 
emphasizing the primacy of market determination. Following the precepts of the efficient 
market hypothesis (Fama, 1970), control of corporations involves the use of ever greater 
transparency and disclosure.  
                                                 
1
 CAD- numbers refers to the document identification at the Cadbury Archive in the library of the Judge 
Business School at the University of Cambridge. 
    
Professional advisers to both corporations and investment firms include the lawyers and 
accountants who gain their special place in corporate affairs and capital markets by virtue of 
their specialist knowledge and adherence to professional norms. These logics presume that 
such norms take precedence over mere commercial benefit. But the recurrent crisis in 
corporate governance has been traced, at least in part, to the failure of these professionals to 
give sufficient primacy to the norms. The accounting profession, for example, faced a 
competing logic from the commercial imperatives of running large organizations themselves 
(Hinings, Brown, & Greenwood, 1991; Suddaby, Gendron, & Lam, 2009; Thornton, Jones, 
& Kury, 2005). 
These logics may bring different understandings to bear on the specific recipes of the 
new proto-institution that embraces all three fields. A managerial logic might value the 
advice and counsel of non-executives, that is, the service role of directors, over the control 
function, and the decisive power of a unified leader implied by embodying the chairman and 
CEO in one person. A market-logic might favour a controlling board, with strong 
supervisory powers (though not at the cost of financial performance) and certainly a 
separation of chairman and CEO. A professional logic would look for standards to be 
applied, albeit with discretion, the type of discretion implied in the principle of comply-or-
explain. It might also advocate a clear evidence-base for the decision. As we shall see, the 
evidence is somewhat less than clear.  
Direction for development 
The balance of this paper will involve a detailed analysis of the debate that led to 
formulation in Cadbury of explanation as a means of compliance, and how that comply-or-
explain rule was debated again in 2003 and then again in 2009-10. These were the versions 
of the UK code of corporate governance that underwent consultative scrutiny in the wake of 
fresh crises of legitimacy. It then set this debate in the context of the notions of 
reasonableness and rationality in Toulmin and Rorty’s contingency and solidarity, 
suggesting that in “comply-or-explain” the corporate governance world has stumbled its way 
through contingency into reasonableness.  
For developmental purposes, BAM participants might offer other insights, either in 
examples of similar practices in other domains or in the philosophical underpinnings 
sketched here.  
References 
Aguilera, R. V., & Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2009). Codes of Good Governance. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 17(3), 376-387.  
Ashby, W. R. (1958). Requisite variety and its implications for the control of complex 
systems. Cybernetica, 1(2), 83-99.  
Ashby, W. R. (1968/2011). Variety, constraint, and the law of requisite variety. Emergence: 
Complexity and Organization, 13(1-2), 190-207.  
Cadbury, A. (1992). The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance.   Retrieved April 9, 
2007, from http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf 
Czarniawska, B., & Joerges, B. (1996). The travel of ideas. In B. Czarniawska & G. Sevon 
(Eds.), Translating Organizational Change (pp. 13-48). Berlin: de Gruyter. 
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., & Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a Stewardship Theory of 
Management. Academy of Management Review, 22(1), 20-47.  
    
Fama, E. F. (1970). Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work. 
Journal of Finance, 25(2), 383-417. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00518.x 
Fligstein, N., & McAdam, D. (2012). A Theory of Fields. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Friedland, R., & Alford, R. R. (1991). Bringing society back in: Symbols, practices, and 
institutional contradictions. In W. W. Powell & P. DiMaggio (Eds.), The New 
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (pp. 232-263). Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Hinings, C. R., Brown, J. L., & Greenwood, R. (1991). Change in an autonomous 
professional organization. Journal of Management Studies, 28(4), 375-393.  
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. The Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 
305-360. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.94043 
Lok, J. (2010). Institutional Logics as Identity Projects. Academy of Management Journal, 
53(6), 1305-1335.  
MacAvoy, P., & Millstein, I. (2003). The Recurrent Crisis In Corporate Governance. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Nordberg, D. (2012). Institutional logics, translated, in corporate governance. Paper 
presented at the European Group for Organizational Studies, Helsinki.  
Ocasio, W. (2011). Attention to Attention. ORGANIZATION SCIENCE, 22(5), 1286-1296. 
doi: 10.1287/orsc.1100.0602 
Pearlstein, S. (2014, January). Social Capital, Corporate Purpose and the Revival of 
American Capitalism. Center for Effective Public Management at Brookings.  
Retrieved February 22, 2014, from 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/01/10%20social%20ca
pital%20corporate%20purpose%20pearlstein/brookingspearlsteinv5_revised%20feb
%202014.pdf 
Puxty, A. G., Willmott, H. C., Cooper, D. J., & Lowe, T. (1987). Modes of regulation in 
advanced capitalism: Locating accountancy in four countries. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 12(3), 273-291. doi: 10.1016/0361-3682(87)90041-9 
Rorty, R. (1989). Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Simon, H. A. (1955). A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 69(2), 99-118.  
Simon, H. A. (1959). Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science. 
American Economic Review, 49(3), 253-283.  
Simon, H. A. (1978). Rationality as Process and Product of Thought. American Economic 
Review, 68(2), 4.  
Spira, L. F., & Slinn, J. (2013). The Cadbury Committee: A History. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Suddaby, R., Gendron, Y., & Lam, H. (2009). The organizational context of professionalism 
in accounting. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34(3–4), 409-427. doi: 
10.1016/j.aos.2009.01.007 
Taleb, N. N. (2007). The Black Swan: The impact of the highly improbable. London: 
Penguin. 
Thornton, P. H. (2004). Markets from Culture: Institutional Logics and Organizational 
Decisions in Higher Education Publishing. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Thornton, P. H., Jones, C., & Kury, K. (2005). Institutional logics and institutional change in 
organizations: Transformation in accounting, architecture, and publishing. Research 
    
in the Sociology of Organizations, 23, 125–170. doi: 10.1016/S0733-
558X(05)23004-5 
Thornton, P. H., Ocasio, W., & Lounsbury, M. (2012). The Institutional Logics Perspective: 
A New Approach to Culture, Structure, and Process. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Toulmin, S. (1992). Cosmopolis: Hidden Agenda of Modernity. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Toulmin, S. (2001). Return to Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Toulmin, S. (2003). The Uses of Argument (Updated ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
 
